Curious Wonder web notes

You still might wonder how the marks being scribbled and erased by demons inside the computer are supposed to represent or stand for things in the world. Who decides that this mark in the system corresponds to that bit of the world? In the case of a computer, the answer is obvious: we get to decide what the symbols mean, because we built the machine. But who means the meaning of the symbols allegedly inside its'? Philosophers call this the problem of "intentionality" (confusingly, because it has nothing to do with intentions). There are two common answers. One is that a symbol is connected to its referent in the world by our sense organs. Your mother's face reflects light, which stimulates your eye, which triggers a cascade of templates or similar circuits, which inscribe the symbol mother in your mind. The other answer is that the unique pattern of symbol manipulations triggered by the first symbol mirrors the unique pattern of relationships between the referent of t...

The computational theory of mind also rehabilitates once and for all the infamous homunculus. A standard objection to the idea that thoughts are internal representations (an objection popular among scientists trying to show how tough-minded they are) is that a representation would require a little man in the head to look at it, and the little man would require an even littler man to look at the representations inside him, and so on, ad infinitum. But once more we have the spectacle of the theoretician insisting to the electrical engineer that if the engineer is correct his workstation must contain hordes of little elves. Talk of homunculi is indispensable in computer science. Data structures are read and interpreted and examined and recognized and revised all the time, and the subroutines that do so are unashamedly called "agents," "demons," "supervisors," "monitors," "interpreters," and "executives." Why doesn't all this ...